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ABSTRACT 
The paper examines the scope for shareholder ratification, by majority or unanimous vote, 
of directors ' actions under s1 77 of the Companies Act 1993, with particular focus on 
actions that breach a director's duty to the company. The origins of the common law 
doctrine of ratification and the major issues associated with it are explored and the position 
summarised. The Law Commission's 1989 proposals for reform, based on a reallocation of 
responsibilities between directors and shareholders, are then considered before the two 
limbs of sl 77 are addressed. The scope of the first limb, defined by the powers vested in 
shareholders, is explored. It is concluded that the provision is not able to be used to ratify 
directors ' usurpation of powers that shareholders might be considered to hold at common 
law. The paper then examines the scope of operation of the second limb, sl 77(4) , which 
preserves the common law rules. The compatibility of ratification with the prohibition on 
indemnification under s 162 is analysed and the difficulty posed by directors ' duties now 
being specified in statute evaluated. The operation of ratification is considered in respect of 
the general duties contained in s 131-13 7 and other selected duties. The effect of ratification 
in relation to remedies available under the Act is also analysed. The conclusion .is that, 
although the Act has eliminated the possibility of ratification in several areas, and there is 
uncertainty over some aspects of its operation, the doctrine remains workable and effective. 
It is argued that this outcome is appropriate. 
The text of this paper including all footnotes comprises 15,130 words. 
The cover, contents page, abstract, and bibliography comprises 801 words. 
I INTRODUCTION 
"It is trite law, I had thought, that if directors do acts, as they do every day, 
especially in private companies, which, perhaps because there is no
 quorum, 
or because their appointment was defective, or because sometimes 
there are 
no directors properly appointed at all, or because they are ac
tuated by 
improper motives, they go on doing for years, carrying on the busin
ess of the 
company in the way in which, if properly constituted, they could carry it on, 
and then t/7ey find that everything has been done so to speak wrongl
y because 
it was not done by a proper board, such directors can, by making a
 full and 
frank disclosure and calling together the general body of shareholde
rs, obtain 
absolution and forgiveness of their sins; and provided the acts are 
not ultra 
vires the company as a whole everything will go on as if it had been a/right 
from the beginning. " 
1 
"Ratification itself is a concept which has been mistakenly transferre
d into the 
domain of corporate law. Conceptually, the idea that either a majo
rity at the 
general meeting or a board of directors can extinguish a corporat
e right to 
pursue remedial action for a breach of duty owed to it does not make
 sense. " 2 
The ratification by shareholders of directors ' breaches of duty ow
ed to the 
company is an analytically complex subject so it is not surprising that 
it should also be 
contentious. Despite this, it is common practice to have shareholders
 ratify an action 
of the board over which some doubt may exist in the expectation th
at this will both 
bind the company to the transaction and immunise directors f
rom suit. The 
effectiveness of ratification is, therefore, important to the corporate co
mmunity. 
1 Bamfordv Bamford[l970] Ch 212 per Harman LJ, 237-8 
2 Saul Fridman, "Ratification of Directors' Breaches" (1992) 10 Co 
& Sec TL 252, 256 
Laws 523/531 Corporate and Banking Law 
Ratification under the Companies Act 1993 
2 
There is no general provision in New Zealand law providing expressly for the 
release of directors from liability through shareholder ratification. 3 On the contrary, 
s177(3) of the Companies Act 19934 empowers a court to make any order that might 
otherwise be available to it notwithstanding that shareholders may have ratified the 
board's actions under sl 77(1). But then there is sl 77(4) which appears to preserve 
the common law rules on ratification. At common law, the minority must submit to 
the majority in most circumstances and ratification will usually protect directors from 
action by a minority shareholder on the company's behalf. Such actions are 
constrained to those within the exceptions to the rule in Foss v Harbottle. 5 Further, 
the acceptance at common law that a shareholder generally owes no fiduciary duty to 
other shareholders and can therefore vote entirely in their own interests6 gives 
majority rule special force. 
There are, however, reasons to question whether ratification has this efficacy 
under the Act. It can be interpreted as the company indemnifying the directors, an 
action prohibited by s 162. The Act sets out the duties directors owe to the company: 
can shareholders modify these statutory obligations by means of a common law 
doctrine? In s 107 the Act specifies the process to be followed if its requirements 
concerning certain transactions involving shareholders' interests are to be avoided: 
can they also be avoided via ratification? Finally, inquiry into the origins of the Act 
reveals that the original architects did not envisage that shareholders should have the 
power to forgive directors for breaches of duty to the company. 
Colouring the consideration of these issues is the remedial regime intended to 
provide "protection for shareholders and creditors against the abuse of management 
power". 7 In particular, the Act provides for a derivative action intended to unshackle 
shareholders from the bonds of the rule in Foss v Harbottle. An objection to common 
3 New Zealand follows the United Kingdom in this respect. In contrast, most states in the United States 
and countries in Western Europe allow by statute for directors to be released from liability for fully 
disclosed breaches by a simple majority vote in general meeting. See Robert R Pennington Directors 
Personal liability BSP Professional Books, IOI 
4 Henceforth referred to as "the Act". Section references are those contained in the Act. 
5 
( 1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189. "Ratifiability" (the possibility of the majority ratifying an action) is 
the foundation of the internal management limb of the rule. McDougall v Gardiner ( 1875) I Ch 13 , per 
Nellish J, 25 
6 North-west Transportation Company ltdv Beatty (1887) 12 AppCas 589 
7 Long Title, paragraph (d) 
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law ratification is that it immediately circumscribes the derivative ac
tion. A minority 
shareholder will fail to obtain leave to commence an action because r
atification means 
there is no likelihood of the action succeeding. 
The two facets of ratification have been adverted to. The first is the
 effect on 
the transaction involved. Usually, the issue will be whether the com
pany is bound to 
an outsider. This is a subject in itself although many of the diffic
ulties previously 
surrounding the matter have been removed by ss 1 7-18. The oth
er aspect is the 
accountability of directors, and the capacity of shareholders to releas
e them from the 
liability that would otherwise ensue from a breach of duty. Lo
rd Wedderburn 
declared that "the limits of that Rule [in Foss v Harbottle] lie along t
he boundaries of 
majority rule."
8 This paper will investigate the extent to which the Act has realigned
 
those boundaries. It seeks to establish whether the apparent confiden
ce in ratification 
under the Act is justified. 
8 KW Wedderburn "Shareholders' Rights and the Rule in Foss v Har
bottle" [1957] CLJ 194,198 
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II RATIFICATION AT COMMON LAW 
A The doctrinal origins 
The doctrinal foundations of ratification lie in agency, equity and partnership. 
Ratification is primarily an agency concept.9 Directors in the nineteenth century were 
often thought of as agents of the corporation and by that time the law had recognised 
that a principal could ratify the actions of an agent acting beyond their ostensible 
authority. 10 Direr.tors were also considered to be analogous to trustees and it was 
similarly well-established in equity that a fiduciary could obtain release from their 
strict obligations by making a full disclosure. 
"If ... Mr. Heathorn had openly and directly brought forward the matter before 
the body of shareholders generally, I consider it possible, if not probable, that 
he would have been allowed to receive, and would now have been entitled to 
retain all the sums in question paid for commission. " 11 
In explaining the origins of the internal management limb of Foss v Harbottle, 
Wedd~rburn says it was a partnership doctrine imported into company law.12 By the 
early nineteenth century equity courts would only intervene in partnerships to dissolve 
them, the courts being wary of becoming the arbiter of every internal dispute. This 
attitude was extended to companies prior to the first Companies Act in 1844 and then 
became embedded despite partnership law moving on from this philosophical stance. 
"The law had long recognised majority rule as a fundamental principle 
concerning corporations, so that there was no difficulty in expressing majority 
rule as the justification for the refusal to interfere in internal management. "13 
9 RJC Partridge "Ratification and the Release of Directors from Personal Liability" [1987) CLJ 122. 
Partridge claims that ratification in the corporate context "has nothing to do with "ratification" as it is 
understood in the law of agency". 
10 Irvine v Union Bank of Australia ( 1887) 2 AppCas 366 where directors exceeded their borrowing 
powers is an early company example. 
11 Benson v Heathorn ( 1842) I Y & CCC 326, 343-4 
12 Wedderburn, above n8, 196 
13 Wedderburn, above n8, 198 
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B Policy condderations 
Wedderburn's comments suggest that the attachment to majority rule in 
company law is essentially policy based rather than doctrinally driven. The rule in 
Foss v Harbottle came about because of the rapid expansion in the middle of the 
nineteenth century in representative actions by shareholders to vindicate their general 
rights in relation to railway companies. A means had to be found of preventing courts 
from being overwhelmed: the rule in Foss v Harbottle, confirmed almost immediately 
by Mozley v Alston, 14 was that means. Concern over the pressure on court resources 
remains a strong influence today and judges can be susceptible to arguments that 
justify non-intervention, such as commercial effectiveness. 
"The liquidator or the directors are usually the people who can see the whole 
picture, whereas the individual shareholder or creditor often does not have all 
the information. " 15 
Danckwerts J in Pavlides v Jensen
16 opined that shareholders must accept the 
consequences if they choose to place their interests in the hands of "an amiable set of 
lunatics", a view not unrepresentative of English judges in cases up to that time. 
C What is meant by "the company"? 
Much of the conceptual difficulty with ratification stems from the status of the 
company as a separate legal person 
17 that, in its own right, is owed duties by those 
managing it. The problem is that the company itself cannot act directly but only 
through natural persons so forgiveness of breaches must be performed by somebody 
on its behalf. Which organ of the company should properly be regarded as competent 
14 (1847) I Ph . 790 
15 Mesenberg v Cord Industrial Recruiters (1996) 14 ACLC 519 at 525. Young J illustrates this point 
by saying a board might tolerate a chief executive paying themselves "some thousands of dollars in 
tmauthorised commissions" on the grounds that the guilt complexes so generated prevented the chief 
executive seeking higher remuneration. It is an extraordinary example. 
16 
[ 1956] I Ch 565 
17 Preserved by s26 
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to discharge this function - the board, the majority of shareholders, all of the 
shareholders or should ratification be an impossibility? 
The matter forces consideration of what is "the company". Whose interests 
must be taken into account before it is safe to regard the beneficiary of the duty as 
having waived the obligation owed to it? Do only existing shareholders need to be 
considered or do future shareholders enter the picture? Do non-shareholders, such as 
creditors, employees, or even the community, have interests that should be 
considered? The law's traditional answer is that "the company" is not the commercial 
entity but the existing shareholders as a general body. 18 It follows that the 
shareholders, as a group, must be competent to ratify directors ' breaches. 
"Jn a solvent company the proprietary interests of the shareholders entitle 
them as a general body to be regarded as the company when questions of the 
duty of directors arise. If, as a general body, they authorise or ratify a 
particular action of the directors there can be no challenge to the validity of 
what the directors have done. But where a company is insolvent the interests 
of the creditors intrude. "19 
D Shareholder decision-making 
It is a principle of common law that shareholders have the power to bind the 
company in contract by unanimous agreement, even informally.20 The principle 
extends to breaches of duty. 
"ft seems to me plain that an acknowledgement signed by the directors in 
relation to their own debt would be fully effective if sanctioned by every 
member of the company. If so sanctioned I do not see how it could be said 
that directors were acting in breach of their fiduciary duty. "21 
18 Greenhalgh v Aderne Cinemas Ltd [ 1950] I Ch 286, per Evershed MR, 291 
19 Kinsel a v Russell Kinsel a Pty Ltd (in liq) ( 1986) 4NSWLR 722, per Street CJ, 730 
20 Jn re Duomatic Ltd [1969] 2 Ch 365 
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In Pascoe Ltd (in liq) v Lucas2
2 it was held that, provided they acted in good 
faith, where directors complied with the wishes of the sole shareholder no action
 
could be taken subsequently by the company or the liquidator. 
If the application of the unanimity principle to this area is unexceptional, the 
application of the majority principle is more problematic. First, the majority is clearly
 
not "the corporators as a general body".
23 The interests of the majority will not 
necessarily be the same as those of the totality. This difficulty is overcome, however,
 
if "the general body" is regarded as equivalent "to an individual hypothetical 
member".24 Provided the majority does not act in some unconscionable way, the law
 
has been prepared to accept that the course preferred by it can be safely assumed to be 
in the interests of that hypothetical member. Another problem with majority vote 
ratification is that it enabled things that would otherwise require a special resolution 
(because it would require amendment of the articles) to be done by ordinary 
resolution. Notwithstanding these objections, the common law clearly accepted the 
majority as competent to effect ratification, among other things. 
"A majority of shareholders in general meeting is entitled to pursue what 
course it chooses without the company 's powers, however wrong-headed it 
may appear to others, provided the majority do not unfairly oppress other 
members of the company ... "
25 
E Other possibilities 
In principle, at least, the board should be capable of ratification provided it 
acts i,1 the best interests of the company.
26 Some cases appear to support this 
proposition, for example, Queensland Mines Ltd v Hudson, 
27 although this is usually 
21 Jn re Gee & Co (Woolwich) Ltd [ I 975] I Ch 52, 71 
22 (1998) 27 ACSR 737 
23 Greenhalgh v Aderne Cinemas Ltd, above n 18, 291 
24 Greenhalgh v Aderne Cinemas Ltd, above n 18, 291 
25 Hogg v Cramphorn Ltd [ 1967] Ch 254, per Buckley J at 268 
26 As in many jurisdictions in the United States, above n3 . 
27 [1978] 18 ALR I 
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rationalised on the more narrow grounds of a board honestly rejecting a corporate 
opportunity that a director was then free to pursue. 
Equally, it is possible that ratification should not be available to any organ 
within the company. There are two legs to this argument. The first is that "the 
company" should be regarded as an enterprise itself, with interests distinct from those 
of its proprietors. The other is that while there may be nothing wrong with the 
theoretical foundations of ratification, the reality in modem companies is that general 
meetings are easily controlled by a small minority of shareholders.28 
F How is ratification effected? 
The basis of ratification is the notion that if full disclosure is made the 
beneficiary of a fiduciary duty can release the fiduciary from their duty. It has not 
always been apparent that complete disclosure was made. Modem Australian 
authority29 is helpful in this regard, establishing that full and frank disclosure is 
required. For a vote by the general meeting to be effective, the notice convening the 
meeting must set out clearly the nature of the actual or envisaged departure from the 
duty, state that the directors seek to be absolved from that breach and that the meeting 
will be asked to authorise that breach and waive its consequences. 30 
Another contentious matter has been the extent to which directors can vote 
their own shares on the resolution. There is substantial authority to say that where the 
breach is ratifiable, the directors may vote because in doing so they are exercising 
their property rights as shareholders. In this capacity, they do not owe fiduciary 
28 Fridman, above n2, 255 
29 Kinsela, above n 19; Winthrop Investments Ltd v Winns Ltd [ 1975] 2NSWLR 666 
30 Winthrop , above n29, 674. In this case, the resolutions ratifying the board ' s allotment of shares 
motivated by an improper purpose were held ineffectual because adequate disclosure of what was 
involved had not been made to shareholders before they voted. 
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duties to other shareholders.
31 The danger, however, is that the directors' self-interest 
may infect the general meeting so that the meeting itself acts for an improper purpose 
or oppresses the minority.
32 Certainly it is safest if interested parties abstain. In the 
case of publicly listed companies, the Listing Rules require qualifying related party 
transactions to be approved by a majority of "non-associated" shareholders.
33 
G Release from liability 
There is debate on whether, at common law, ratification is an absolute release 
from liability or simply constrains other shareholders from initiating action.
34 The 
answer appears to be the latter because ratification is a gratuitous act; both law and 
equity required accord and satisfaction for a release to be binding. A release had to be 
for valuable consideration
35 or executed by the company under seal. Alternatively, a 
director might be able to argue estoppel if they had acted on a ratification to their 
detriment.36 In the absence of any of these, the director remained exposed legally, 
although he or she was protected, in practice, from existing shareholders because the 
power to sue directors rested with the general meeting. A resolution excusmg a 
director from liability precluded a general meeting from passing a subsequent 
resolution that an action be brought, thereby prevented the minority from suing.
37 
H Summary 
One conclusion that commentators seem able to agree on is that the law in this area 
lacks coherence. It is "singularly muddled". 
38 
31 North-west Transportation Company Ltd v Beatty, above n6, 
32 Residues Treatment and Trading Co Ltd v Southern Resources Ltd (No4) (1989) 14 ACLR 569 
33 Rule 9 .3. I 
34 See Ross Cranston "Limiting Directors' Liability: Ratification, Exemption and Indemnification" 
[I 992] JBL I 97 and Partridge, above n9 
35 Professor Welling's ' '· horse, hawk, robe or peppercorn" quoted in Fridman, above n2, 255 
36 Partridge dismisses this, above n9, 129 
37 Pennington, above n3, 102 
38 Cranston, above n34 
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"The ruler regarding ratification ... . have developed in a haphazard and 
piecemeal way. No general principle can be stated; the most that can be done 
is to state the position in relation to different kinds of breach or 
. l . ,,39 zrregu anty. 
The majority can ratify: 
• The exercise of a power for an improper purpose, either prospectively or 
retrospectively (the ratio of Bamforc/0); 
• The making of an incidental profit by directors ( obiter in Regal (Hastings) Ltd v 
Gulliver41 ); 
• The negligent acts of directors (Pavlides v Jensen42 ) , at least where the directors 
have not benefited personally from the breach (Daniels v Daniels & Ors43). 
Beyond these narrow propositions, there is ample dicta in cases declaring that the 
general meeting has wide powers to forgive breaches of duty.44 
Generally speaking, fraud (in the equitable sense of unconscionable conduct) 
and misappropriation mark off breaches that cannot be ratified by a general meeting.45 
The majority cannvt ratify: 
• The expropriation of property (including excessive remuneration) or an 
39 Andrew Borrowdale Duties and Responsibilities of Directors and Company Secretaries in New 
Zealand CCH, 76 
40 Above nl 
41 [1942] 1 All ER 378 
42 Above nl6 
43 [1978] 2 WLR 73 
44 For example, Buckley J in Hogg v Cramphorn Ltd, above n25 
45 Cranston, above n34, 200 and Gower's Principles of Modern Company Law, 64 7 
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opportunity which belongs in equity to the company (Cook v Deeks, 
46 GE Smith, 
Ltd v Smith, 47 Miller (lnvercargill) Ltd v Maddams
48
); 
• An arrangement entered into by an insolvent company to the prejudice of creditors 
(Kinsela 49); 
• Any transaction where the majority in general meeting acts for the same improper 
purpose as the directors (Residues5°); 
• A matter that is oppressive of the minority (Hogg v Cramphorn Ltd, 
51 Jenkins v 
Enterprise Gold Mines NL
52
). 
I The Law Commission's reform proposals 
In structure and content, the Act closely resembles the draft statute included in 
the Commission's report.
53 The Commission was particularly concerned about the 
misuse of the corporate form, with references to it peppering the report, 
54 and the goal 
of ensuring good corporate governance was clearly a major influence in the legislation 
it proposed. Among the Commission's key principles were the following: 
• The company should be regarded as the enterprise rather than the body of 
shareholders. 55 
46 [1916] 1 AC554 
47 
[ 1952] NZLR 4 70 
48 
[ 1938] NZLR 490 
49 Above nl9 
50 Above n32 
51 Above n25 
52 
( 1992) 6ACSR 539 
53 Company law Reform and Restatement New Zealand Law Commission Report No 9 ( 1989) 
54 Above n53 , paragraphs 16, 20, 23, 69, 85, 134. 
55 Above n53 , paragraphs 162, 189, 192 
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• Power and responsibility should be allocated between the vanous maJor 
interest groups according to a statutory framework rather than by a deemed 
contract. 56 
• Directors should be accorded the statutory right to manage but subject to 
explicit duties. 57 
• Shareholders should be excluded from management and dispute settlement. 
Their powers should be restricted to matters affecting their proprietorial 
interests directly. 58 
• The courts are the proper bodies to resolve disputes. Access should be 
strengthened so that shareholders could enforce their rights directly. 59 
In its subsequent report, 60 the Commission proposed that certain transactions should be 
able to be undertaken by unanimous agreement. This became s 107. 
J Ratification under the draft statute 
The Commission had little faith in the general meeting. 
"The general meeting has not historically operated to protect shareholders 
from director abuse of their powers of management but rather has often been 
used as a cypher by directors to absolve themselves of responsibility. "61 
It considered there were more effective ways to protect shareholders and, 
accordingly, rejected the notion of expanding the decision making authority of 
shareholders in the overall scheme of powers. The greater the role of the general 
56 Above n53, paragraph I 0 
57 Above n53, paragraphs 85-93 
58 Above n53, paragraphs 196-213 
59 Above n53, paragraph 143 
60 Report No 16 
61 Above n53, paragraph 197 
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meeting in management, the greater the need to develop a concept of fiduciary duty 
owed by the majority to the minority.
62 Specifically, it believed the power of the 
general meeting to ratify director wrong doing should be removed. 
63 Shareholder 
ratification should be effective only "to condone usurpation of powers reserved to 
shareholders and even in these cases it should not be a bar to a personal or derivative 
action. "64 It provided so, in very clear terms, in clause 136 of its draft, equating to 
what is now sl 77(1 )-(3). There was no equivalent of sl 77( 4) for obvious reasons. 
The Commission' s approach to shareholders power over management is seen 
m s 109 of the Act. It empowers a meeting of shareholders to pass resolutions 
concerning the management of the company
65 but makes it clear that such resolutions 
are not binding on the board unless the constitution provides for them to be so.
66 
K The statute as enacted 
Despite encountering opposition from the Department of Justice, the 
legislation that emerged from the House bears the Commission's imprint, with the 
scheme of responsibilities and powers, the unanimous consent provision and the 
remedial regime all surviving basically intact. Changes were introduced, however, to 
the ratification provision by the addition of sl 77(4). The question of whether the 
latter can mean what it says in the context of the other changes introduced by the Act 
will be considered later. First, it is appropriate to consider the scope of shareholder 
ratification as the Commission originally envisaged it, namely sl 77(1) to (3). 
62 Above n53, paragraph 21 O 
63 Above n53, paragraph 86 
64 Above n53, paragraph 569 
65 Section I 09(2) 
66 Section I 09(3) 
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III THE FIRST LIMB OF SECTION 177 
A Introduction 
The section provides that where, individually or collectively, directors exercise 
"a power vested in the shareholders" the purported exercise of the power can be 
"ratified or approved" in the same manner as the power could have been exercised. 67 
Once ratified, the original exercise "is deemed to be, and always to have been, a 
proper and valid exercise of that power".68 The ratification does not, however, 
prevent a court from exercising powers that would otherwise be available to it.69 
B "Purported exercise" 
The scope of the provision is limited to where directors purport to exercise a 
shareholder power or, as is it sometimes put, where they "usurp" the powers of 
shareholders. It does not apply to the exercise of shareholder powers by shareholders 
themselves. It does not cover a situation where shareholders may exercise a power 
imperfectly, for example, by adopting a change to the constitution or approving a 
major transaction by an ordinary resolution. Shareholders cannot rely on sl 77(1) to 
prove the adequacy of their later action in passing a special resolution.70 Equally, if 
the power exercised by the shareholders is truly theirs to exercise, a complaining 
shareholder cannot invoke sl 77(3) to say that a remedy is nonetheless available. In 
MacFarlane v Barlow71 counsel argued that the action of the directors in using their 
67 Section 177( I) 
68 Section 177(2) 
69 Section 177(3) 
70 The validity of the action taken would need to be evaluated in the context of the statutory provisions 
applicable. 
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majority to procure ratification by the general meeting of the salaries paid was the 
exercise of a shareholder power, not a purported exercise by the directors of a 
shareholder power. His submission that this rendered sl 77(3) inapplicable was 
accepted. 72 
C "Ratified or approved" 
There are no minimum requirements that must be met for ratification to be 
effective. Presumably, therefore, the common law continues to apply on the 
disclosure required and on whether the directors concerned can vote. However, it 
must be borne in mind that the ratification will not necessarily relate to actions that 
involve a breach of duty. Frequently, the ratification will relate to where directors 
have honestly but erroneously taken an action that, under the constitution, is reserved 
to shareholders. In these circumstances, the requirement for special disclosure is 
likely to be minimal. 
The provision provides that directors' actions may be "ratified or approved", 
raising the questi0n of whether "approved" is to be regarded as included within 
ratification or is something distinct. In favour of the former is the way a variety of 
terms are used in the cases as synonyms for ratification, for example, "confirmation", 
"adoption", "affirmation" and "endorsement".
73 Further, if intended to be distinct, it 
is difficult to determine what it means. It might be that "ratification" is intended to 
apply to a specific resolution to ratify whereas "approved" refers to some more 
generalised action such as the adoption of the directors' report. Some support for this 
can be drawn from Master Venning's judgment in MacFarlane v Barlow. In a section 
headed "Salaries issues/ratification" he said: 
"The evidence is that the directors' report and accounts were approved at the 
annual general meetings of the company for the years ending 31 March 1994 
and 31 March 1995. Minutes of the meeting are before the Court. The 
71 (1997) 8NZCLC 261,470 
72 The point was not decisive, Master Venning holding that a common law cause of action was 
available. 
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accounts that were before those meetings include the salaries. It is the 
Respondents' case that as the salaries were approved by the shareholders the 
company could have no claim against the Respondents in respect of those 
salaries. "74 
Later he said: 
"On the current state of the authorities the position must be arguable that the 
company has a claim against the Respondents in relation to the salaries 
notwithstanding the approval at the annual general meeting of the 
accounts. "75 
Reference to other parts of the Act fails to illuminate the meaning of 
"approved". Section 106 requires that shareholders must "approve" major 
transactions and amalgamations by special resolution. Unless the association of 
"approve" with matters subject to special resolution can in some way imply that more 
than a bare majority is required before an action can be "approved" under sl 77(1) (an 
unlikely conclusion) it would appear that the disjunctive framing of the provision is 
not significant. 
D Scope of s177(1) 
The scope of the provision is determined principally by whatever powers are 
"vested in shareholders". Possible sources of these are the constitution, the Act and 
common law. There are issues about the way the provision operates in relation to 
powers arising from the first two sources and a question over whether it extends to the 
third. 
E Powers under the constitution 
73 Partridge, above n9, 122 contains citations. 
74 Above n71, 261 ,475 
75 Above n71 , 261,475-6 
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A wide range of matters can be made subject to shareholder approval. 
76 
Examples include approval of change of name, borrowing, distributions, issue of
 
shares, and directors ' remuneration. Whenever directors act on any of the matters so 
reserved without the requisite shareholder approval it would not appear open to doubt 
that shareholders can ratify or approve the actions under sl 77(1). Few powers are, in 
fact, reserved to shareholders under the Act; most powers, being those needed to 
operate the company, are conferred on directors under s 128. Therefore, powers 
specifically reserved to shareholders under the constitution will often be powers of
 
management and in exercising them shareholders will be deemed to be directors, 
attracting the duties applicable to directors. 
77 This would seem to mean that 
shareholders cannnt simply "ratify" an action involving a breach of duty because they 
themselves would be breaching it. For example, directors may borrow at a level 
requiring shareholder approval. The borrowing may place the company in a position 
where either s135 (reckless trading) or s136 (ability to perform obligations) is 
breached. In these circumstances, any "ratification" of the directors action might 
relieve the directors of liability but would cause the shareholders themselves to breach 
the Act. The scope of sl 77(1) in respect of powers vested in shareholders under a 
company's constitution is probably limited in practice for this reason. 
F Powers under the Act over appointment and removal of directors and 
auditors 
Section 36 mentions five matters in respect of which a share gives the holder 
the right to participate in decision making. The first of these is the power, subject to 
any different requirement in its constitution, to appoint7
8 and remove79 directors by 
ordinary resolution. Similarly, only shareholders have the power to appoint 
auditors. 80 If directors attempted to appoint other directors or an auditor it would 
seem straightforward that shareholders can ratify by ordinary resolution, this being the 
means of exercising the original power. 
76 Section 27 
77 Section 126(2) 
78 Section 153(2) 
79 Section I 56(1) 
80 Section 196( 1) 
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G Powers under the Act over the constitution, major transactions, 
amalgamations and liquidations 
These are the other matters listed in s36. The powers can only be exercised by 
way of special re3olution. 81 Given that s106(1) specifically refers to " ... when 
shareholders exercise a power to .. . " it might be thought that each of the matters 
identified is the subject of "a power vested in a shareholder". If so, the purported 
exercise of the power by a director should be capable ofratification under sl 77(1). 
One source suggests "that this is not a correct analysis".82 In considering such 
a ratification in relation to a major transaction, the authors comment: 
"Afailure to comply with s129 does not involve the usurpation of shareholder 
powers by directors. Rather, it involves a failure to comply with a statutory 
requirement. There is nothing is sl 77 to indicate that it extends to ratification 
of failures to comply with statutory requirements and while sl 77(4) does 
preserve any other rule of law relating to ratification .. .. there is no general 
rule of law which permits shareholders to ratify breaches by directors of 
• n83 statutory requirements. 
This statement needs refining. It begs the question of which of the Act ' s 
provisions can be avoided by ratification. As discussed below, it is entirely possible 
that "failure to comply with a statutory requirement", s133 for example, can be 
ratified. 
Even if "statutory requirement" is construed in a narrower sense as failing to 
satisfy a specified process, the statement is still questionable. The provisions dealing 
with changes to the constitution84 and amalgamations85 are detailed (especially the 
81 Section I 06( I) 
82 Julie Crengle, Mark Russell, Geof Shirtcliffe "Update on Company Law", NZLS Seminar 2000, 25 
83 Above n82, 25 
84 Section 32 
85 Section 22 I 
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latter), involve parties outside the company and contain penalty provisions. These 
additional steps reinforce the argument that shareholders should be precluded from 
remedying a failure to comply with the Act by ratification. The argument does not 
have the same force in relation to major transactions and liquidations where the only 
requirement is that a special resolution be passed. It would seem consistent with 
sl 77(1) for a subsequent ratification by special resolution to be acceptable. 
There are no penalties attached to a breach of s129 (or s241 concemmg 
placing a company in liquidation) so it cannot be said that Parliament intended the 
provision to have any special governance significance. It is acknowledged that failure 
to comply with s 129 is deemed to be conduct unfairly prejudicial for the purposes of 
sl 7486 but this does not, in itself, preclude ratification. The latter, if it occurred, 
would be a "proper and valid" act by virtue of sl 77(2), reducing the scope for it to be 
found to be oppressive. 
Finally, the Crengle analysis, if correct, would mean that ratification would 
only be available in respect of one of the five powers identified in s36. Yet it is clear 
from the Law Commission's report that the four matters subject to s 106 were 
considered to constitute the core of shareholders ' proprietorial rights in a company. 
87 
As such, they were the precise powers intended to fall within the scope of what is now 
sl 77(1). It is doubtful whether the addition of some minimal "requirements in the 
form of the final legislation is sufficient to exclude the possibility of ratification. 
H Other powers under the Act 
The powers listed in s36( 1) appear to be illustrative rather than exclusive. It 
is, however, only on the matters listed that shareholders are specifically empowered 
by the Act to decide a matter affecting the company. Shareholders do have the ability 
to bypass the Act' s requirements by acting unanimously under s107. Is it possible for 
directors to "usurp" this power such that shareholders might ratify the action under 
86 Section 175(1 )(I) 
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s177(1)? The answer would seem to be no. The formalities surrounding the use of 
the s 107 mechanism are such that it is not meaningful to speak of directors exercising 
this power. Moreover, the agreement or concurrence must be between all entitled 
persons, not just shareholders. 
I Powers at common law 
Shareholders can be regarded as having various "powers" at common law, the 
ability to ratify directors' breaches being one. The obvious question is whether the 
power to ratify is itself a "power" within sl 77(1)? A board might review its decision 
to undertake an action that breaches the directors ' duties to the company, possibly 
because of objections raised by a director. In "confirming" the previous decision are 
they purporting to exercise the power of ratification that only shareholders can validly 
exercise? If so, sh'3reholders could then ratify it in terms of sl 77(1). 
At common law, shareholders are also entitled to exercise management powers 
when directors are unable or unwilling to do so.88 Can a director seize control of a 
company in a deadlock, relying on the ability of shareholders generally to ratify his or 
her actions subsequently because the intervention was something that shareholders 
could have done? One view is that shareholders should look to the court or the 
constitution in such circumstances, with the primary recourse being an application to 
court under s 154 for directors to be appointed. 89 However, s 154 applies where there 
are no directors or the number is insufficient directors to constitute a quorum and it is 
not possible to appoint directors under the constitution. It may not be available where 
directors are at loggerheads. 
87 Above n53 , paragraphs 213,371 ,372 
88 Marshall 's Valve Gear Co Ltd v Manning, Wardle & Co Ltd [ 1909] I Ch 267 
89 Morisons Company and Securities law, paragraph 24.2. 
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J Common law powers excluded 
It is submitted that these powers do not fall within sl 77(1). Firstly, the po
wers 
are not the type of required for a company 's normal operation. They
 are in the nature 
of residual powers that shareholders can exercise in extraordinary ci
rcumstances. As 
such, they are not powers directors can be considered capable of usin
g. Secondly, the 
examples cited can only come within sl 77(1) on an extremely broad
 interpretation of 
the term "powers" that cannot be justified on the construction of th
e Act. There is a 
sub part within Part VII of the Act headed "Powers of Shareholders"
. Within it, s 104 
concerning the exercise of powers reserved to shareholders deals
 with only two 
categories of powers, namely, those reserved by the Act and those
 reserved by the 
constitution. The conclusion must be that Parliament intended t
hat only powers 
vested in shareholders by the Act or constitution should be with
in the scope of 
sl 77(1). 
A contrary view is possible, based on the difference in wording betw
een s 104 
and s 177(1 ). The former refers to "powers reserved to the sharehold
ers" whereas the 
latter concerns a "power vested in the shareholders". The argument 
can be made that 
the term "vested" carries the implication that powers can be deriv
ed from various 
sources and there is no necessary reason to limit these to the two m
entioned in the 
Act. It can also be argued that section 177(1) could easily have added th
e words "by 
the Act or constitution" to make its scope clear. However, it is sugg
ested that, in the 
absence of any provision clearly supporting such an interpretation,
 the shareholder 
"powers" subject to sl 77(1) must be confined to those in the Act or th
e constitution. 
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IV THE SECOND LIMB OF SECTION 177 
A Introduction 
The first limb concerns transactions entered into in excess of authority. There 
is seldom any question that directors are acting within their authority to bind the 
company and therefore outside the scope of sl 77(1). Difficulties normally only arise 
because they exercise their powers improperly, in breach of their duty to the company. 
The question then is whether ratification is effective in releasing directors from 
liability to the company. This falls to be determined under s 177 ( 4) which declares 
that nothing in the section "limits or affects any rule of law relating to the ratification 
or approval by (shareholders) of any act or omission by a director or the board". It 
might seem a reasonable conclusion that the broad sweep of common law concerning 
ratification continues to apply in New Zealand. 
B Origins 
Although elegant in its simplicity, the prov1s10n has the character of an 
afterthought. Efforts to establish the its origins have been unsuccessful90 although the 
following passage provides an explanation: 
(S)ubmissions were made to the Select Committee that ratification of 
breaches of directors ' duties, at least where all shareholders had condoned a 
breach, should be retained in the law. The basic argument is that so long as 
the compa>;y is solvent at the time, it would be unjust for shareholders to have 
forgiven a breach, only to have them, or a liquidator, some time down the 
90 The author contacted Frank Riley, Parliamentary Counsel, and a member of the team within the Law 
Reform Division of the Justice Department that worked on the legislation. Although unable to recall 
the precise reasons for the provision's inclusion, he did confirm that there would exist a departmental 
report to the Select Committee on the topic. Presumably this is archived and would be an appropriate 
starting point for any further research on this topic. 
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track later sue for the breach. The result was a change to clause 15 0 of the 
Companies Bill, which later became sl 77(4) .. .. "
91 
The provision is cast in broad terms and is not, on its face, restricted to circumstances 
where ratification is by unanimity. 
C Implications 
There is some speculation in the literature about the possibility of the 
exceptions to the rule in Foss v Harbottle surviving.
92 If ratification is to have its 
common law significance, the corollary may be that breaches that are not ratifiable 
may still be actionable at common law. If this were the case, a plaintiff would avoid 
the procedural requirement of obtaining the court's leave to commence a derivative 
action. No cases directly support the proposition although Re Northwest Forest 
Products Ltd93 left open the possibility that the common law action remained 
available despite the British Columbian statute saying specifically that ratification was 
merely a factor that the court might have regard to in deciding whether to grant leave 
to bring a statutory derivative action. Hetherington v Carpenter9
4 does say that the 
exceptions to Foss v Harbottle are still available in New Zealand to an overseas 
registered company. The matter has been considered recently in one of the first 
reported cases95 ur1der the provisions establishing the statutory derivative action in 
Australia. 96 It was held that the new provisions prevented any potential recourse to 
the common law causes notwithstanding that such a right may have accrued to the 
plaintiff at the time they came into effect. Although the formulation of the prohibition 
is different in the two countries it is highly unlikely that a New Zealand court would 
recognise an action based on any of the exceptions to Foss v Harbottle. 
9 1 Hugh Rennie QC and Peter Watts, "Directors ' Duties and Shareholders ' Rights" NZLS Seminar 
Aug-Sept 1996, 71 
92 A Fraser "The Companies Act 1993 : Shareholders' Remedies" (1994) 7 AULR 739, 741 
93 1975 WWR 724 
94 
[ 1997) I NZLR 699 
95 Karam v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (2000) 18 ACLC 590 
96 Sections 236 and 237 Corporations Law 
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D Relationship to s177(3) 
The most obvious problem with sl 77(4) is its relationship to sl 77(3). It would 
present less difficulty if it were subject to sl 77(3) meaning the court would have the 
power to intervene notwithstanding any ratification. The problem can be illustrated in 
the following way. 
Every exercise of a power within the scope of sl 77(1) will involve the breach 
of at least one duty, namely, that of complying with the Act or constitution.97 Beyond 
that, the offending action may involve breaches of other duties. Directors may have 
been appointed or shares issued contrary to the constitution to ward off a takeover, (an 
improper purpose). An incompetent or even fraudulent director may have been 
appointed by the board, involving a lack of reasonable skill and care. Purporting to 
put a company into liquidation other than by a special resolution might be regarded as 
incompetence, the facts speaking for themselves. A major transaction subject to a 
ratification as discussed above may be revealed later to have been influenced by self-
interest. Notwithstanding that ratified acts are deemed to be a valid and proper 
exercise of the power infringed from the beginning, s 177 (3) appears to mean that any 
ratification by shareholders will not preclude the court making an award in the event 
that a shareholder brings a derivative action based on the directors' breach. 
This conclusion conflicts with the one produced by analysis under sl77(4). 
Nothing in sl 77(3) limits the power of shareholders at common law to ratify the acts 
of directors. At common law, shareholders may well be able to ratify the breaches 
instanced, meaning the court is excluded from making an order in relation to the 
breach. That this outcome was contemplated by Parliament seems highly unlikely. 
One view is that sl 77(4) must be read "in conjunction with" sl 77(3).98 However, if 
this implies that the latter overrides s 177 ( 4) it is incorrect. Section I 77 ( 4) cannot be 
read as subject to sl 77(3); on the contrary, it is the superior provision. 
97 Section 134 
98 Susan Watson and Owen Morgan, "A matter of balance: the statutory derivative action in New 
Zealand" The Company Lawyer Vol 19 No 8 236, 243 
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E Relationship to sl 07 
The mechanism in s 107 enabling the modification or avoidance of the 
statutory requirements is an embodiment of the unanimity principle. It has, however, 
been restricted in several ways, one of which is its extension to require the approval of 
entitled persons.99 Given its very precise terms, s107 does not permit approval of the 
transactions covered in any other way, including by unanimous shareholder 
agreement. What are the implications for transactions not covered? Clearly, if a 
matter is not listed within s107 the section cannot be used to vary or negate the Act's 
requirements: shareholders cannot, for example, vary directors' responsibilities under 
s 131 via s 107. It does not mean, however, that the unanimity principle is not 
otherwise available in relation to these duties. Section 107 may be regarded as a 
particular expression of the unanimity principle applicable to transactions that pose 
compliance problems for small companies. Its existence should not carry any special 
significance for the ability of shareholders to exercise powers over other matters by 
unanimous agreement. 
99 Robert Dugan, Companies Act 1993: Governance Issues for Closely Held Companies, Ch 6, 33-42 
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V INDEMNIFICATION 
A Prohibition on indemnification 
Ratification pursuant to sl 77(4) faces the objection that it is inconsistent with 
the Act's provisions governing indemnification of directors. Section 162( 1) is a 
general prohibition on indemnification or insurance of directors, other than as 
specifically permitted by the other provisions of the section. Under s162(4), a 
company may indemnify directors for liability and costs in respect of liability to a 
third party (but not to the company) provided it is not for criminal liability or a breach 
of sl 31 (the duty to act in good faith and in the best interests of the company). 
Further, the constitution must specifically allow this. 
B History 
Section 162 is the successor of s204 in the 1955 Act which, in tum, was 
similar if not identical to the United Kingdom provision. 100 The prohibition was 
recommended by the Greene Committee in order to stop the burgeoning practice of 
limiting director liability via provisions in the articles. Such a provision had 
determined the outcome of Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co Ltd, 101 
notwithstanding Romer J's finding that some directors had breached their duties under 
the general law. It has been unclear whether the prohibition extended to ratification 
by virtue of the phrase "or otherwise".102 The commonly held view was that: under 
generally accepted rules of statutory interpretation, these words were insufficient to 
evidence an intention by Parliament to displace an accepted doctrine like ratification. 
Another persuasi"e factor was that no objection was taken on this ground to 
ratification being effective in Regal (Hastings) v Gulliver.103 
100 Now s310 of the Companies Act 1985. 
10 1 
[ 1925] I Ch 407 
102 The prohibition applied to "any provision, whether contained in the articles of a company or in any 
contract with a company or otherwise . .. .. " 
103 Cranston, above n34 
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C Position in Australia 
The issue received detailed consideration in Miller v Miller.
104 The case 
involved the validity of dispositions under a will. The testator gifted property to the 
company of which he was a director and to which he was indebted provided the 
company gave his estate a complete release from liability. One of the arguments 
against validity was that the company could not provide the release sought because of 
s241(1) of the Corporations Law 1992. It reads: 
(I) [Prohibition} A company or a related body corporate must not: 
(a) indemnify a person who is or has been an officer or auditor of the company 
against a liability incurred by the person as such an officer or auditor; and 
(b) exempt such a person from such a liability. 
(IA) [Void indemnities} A memorandum, articles or any other instrument, or an 
agreement or arrangement, is void in so far as it provides for a body corporate to 
do something that subsection (I) prohibits. 
Santow J referred to ratification' s "long history of co-existence with the various 
forms of s241" before stating: 
"Ratification can never be a blanket indemnification or exemption on a 
prospective basis, clearly prohibited by s241 as such would be. Rather it is a 
specific absolution, afforded usually though not always, retrospectively, but 
necessarily for specific and properly disclosed infractions of the director's 
duties and subject to certain limitations .... . The essence of ratification is that 
the release so given obviates the liability, so far as any right to enforce it by 
. . h h Id . d " 105 exzstzng s are o ers zs concerne . 
104 
( 1995) 16 ACSR 73 
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The judge concluded that a documented formal deed of release following a 
valid ratification did not constitute an indemnity in terms of s241(1)(a). It was a 
complete surrender of the company's right to pursue a claim and therefore did more 
than "merely "indemnify" against the consequences of such a claim being brought". 106 
He had more difficulty reconciling the testator's requirements with the prohibition on 
exempting from liability under subsection (b), however, on the grounds that "exempt" 
involved the notion of "to free from an obligation or liability". While the company 
could bind itself at law not to bring a claim and remain within s241, it was 
questionable whether it could purport to free the director from the underlying liability 
on which such a claim would have been based. In the end, Santow J took a broad 
approach, holding that while conceptually distinct, release and exemption amounted 
to the same thing as far as s241 was concerned. 
"The clear policy of s241, as evinced in its earlier reference to "indemnify ", is 
to deal with the consequences of breach of obligation owed to the company, 
not the release of rights which give rise to those obligations. There is a long 
history, known to the legislature, of ratification of such releases. One would 
not have expected that history to have been expunged with no reference in any 
explanatory memorandum or ministerial speech, or in the words of s241 itself 
Section 241 is concerned with "blank cheque" indemnification and exemption, 
while ratification requires specific release after full disclosure of the 
. l fi l . ,, io7 parflcu ar cause or c aim. 
The validity of the gifts was upheld. 
105 Above n I 04, 87 
106 Above n I 04, 88 
107 Above n 104, 88 
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D Implications of Miller for New Zealand 
The foregoing comments are not only clear but also forceful and it might be 
thought that a New Zealand court would reach the same conclusion. However, an 
examination of s 162 discloses reasons to query this. 
Firstly, section 162 contains a definition of "indemnify". This is not the case 
with the Australian provision and consequently Santow J resorted to dictionaries for 
assistance. The definition in the Act is not an exclusive one, giving scope for a wide 
interpi·etation. The term "includes relieve or excuse from liability, whether before or 
after the liability arises". The logic of Miller does not fit well with the precise 
wording of the definition, being based on the conclusion that a "release" falls outside 
the scope of an indemnity. Is there really any difference between "relieve" (the term 
in s 162) and "release"? If not, it would seem that a "release" as interpreted by Santow 
J would fall within the scope of the section. 
Secondly, the inclusion of the phrase "or after" strengthens the argument for 
the prohibition to extend to ratification. As Santow J observed, ratification is almost 
always occurs after a breach of duty. 
Thirdly, th:.!re are two reasons to suggest that it was Parliament's intention to 
include ratification within the scope of s162. The first is "in the words of (sl62) 
itself' to echo Santow J. The 1955 provision did not include the words "or after" and 
they have particular relevance to an area where there was doubt about its applicability. 
The second is the legislation's history. In keeping with its strict view on the need to 
protect the company from abuse of its form by delinquent directors, the Commission 
considered that the existing prohibition on indemnifying directors should be continued 
but that the opportunity should be taken to remove some uncertainties that had 
arisen. 108 One of these measures was to add a definition of "indemnify" in the 
following terms: 
108 Above n53 , paragraph 560 
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"Indemnify" includes relieve or excuse from liability." 
The words "whether before or after the liability arises" were added during the course 
of the Bill's passage in the House. It is reasonable to suggest that these words were 
added to clarify, and perhaps reinforce, the ineffectiveness of ratification other than in 
respect of usurpation by directors of shareholders powers. 
Finally, it should be borne in mind that Miller concerned the validity of a 
testamentary disposition. It is an area where Santow J acknowledged that he should 
seek an interpretation that would uphold the testator's intentions if it were open to him 
to do so. The case did not involve consideration of any specific actions of directors in 
breach of a duty to the company. If it had, the view formed of the gravity of the 
breach may well have an influence on the outcome. This is not to say the judgment is 
unsound. It would, however, be of greater force if the conclusions had emerged from 
a case in which real breaches were in issue. 
For these reasons, there is scope for a New Zealand court to reach a different 
conclusion about the scope of s 162 in comparison to s241 of the Corporations Law. 
Having acknowledged that, the more likely conclusion, given the long history of the 
indemnity provisions in statute, is that ratification will be found consistent with s162. 
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VI RATIFICATION OF BREACHES OF STATUTORY DUTIES 
A Directors' duties specified 
The effectiveness of ratification of breaches of duty also faces a challenge 
from the inclusion in the Act of the duties required of a director. The general duties 
are found in s 131 to 13 7 while duties imposed relating to specific types of 
transactions appear throughout the Act. It is a general proposition of law that a 
statutory provision replaces the common law and the following is a representative 
view of writers: 
"The duties owed by directors are now statutory and it is questionable 
whether liability for breach of a statutory duty can be condoned by the 
shareholders in the absence of statutory authority. "
109 
Section 177(4) may be a statutory "recognition" of ratification but, given its 
unvarnished form, it is doubtful whether it can be regarded as "statutory authority" to 
excuse breaches of the duties contained in the Act. The opening words say 
"(N)othing in this section limits or affects .... " : they do not say "nothing in this Act". 
In the absence of any elaboration in the provision itself of the significance of 
ratification its effe~t must be judged within the overall scheme of the Act. 
B Objections to ratification of statutory duties 
In addition to the general point of legal principle, ratification potentially 
excludes the application of statutory remedies. Professor Baxt points to the 
inconsistency of ratification and injunction.
110 Ifratification is effective, the court's 
109 Andrew Beck, Anrlrew Borrowdale, Lindsay Trotman, David Wishart New Zealand Company Law 
and Practice 1999 CCH Vo! I, 10-895 
11 0 Robert Baxt Duties and Responsibilities of Directors and Officers 16
th ed. 2000 Australian Institute 
of Company Directors" 90 
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power to grant an injunction preventing a breach of the statute 111 or otherwise to order 
directors to comply 112 is negated. The ability to provide consequential relief, such as 
d · d 113 amages, 1s remove . Beyond that, the objection to ratification is readily 
appreciated when the breach of duty attracts a criminal sanction. In such instances, it 
can be assumed that Parliament did not intend that the enforcement regime should be 
negated by means of ratification. 114 However, of the duties covered in ss 131 to 149 
only a breach of s 140( 4) (relating to failure to disclosure interest in a transaction) 
attracts a penalty for breach under ss373 or 374. 
C Is the Act a code? 
Commentators attach significance to the fact that the Bill originally provided 
for directors' duties at common law to continue alongside those specified in the 
legislation. 115 However, this was not in the legislation as enacted, indicating that "the 
Act has moved away from common law notions". 116 
The Law Commission itself did not claim that its proposals amounted to a 
codification. It used phrases such as "a fuller restatement in the statute of the duties 
and powers of directors" 117 to describe them. Moreover, the Act does not provide a 
comprehensive regime of remedies, remaining silent on what remedy is to apply to 
particular breaches. 118 It can be contended, therefore, that the inclusion of the duties 
in the Act does not makes them "statutory" in the sense of excluding the common law. 
If the provisions are simply declaratory of the common law, it can be assumed that 
Parliament intended them to be modifiable in the manner achievable at common law. 
111 Section 164(1) 
112 Section 170 
113 Sections 164(3) and 170 
114 In Miller, above n 104, at 89 Santow J said that ratification might "remove from the scope of 
technical dishonesty such actions as issuing shares for a purpose which is not a proper one, in the sense 
of not being for the benefit of the company as a whole." 
11 5 For example, see Andrew Beck "Enforcing directors' duties - where are the remedies?" New 
Zealand Business Bulletin, No I 1994, 2 and Morison 's Company and Securities Law, Butterworth's, 
Wellington 2000 at paragraph 23.2. However, also see the contrary view that "the mere removal of a 
savings provision from legislation cannot repeal the common law" in Rennie and Watts, above n91 , 2. 
116 Beck, above n 115, 2 
117 Beck, above n 115, 1 
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"The I 993 Act adopts many of the common law duties imposed on directors. 
To refer to this adoption as a "codification " is not entirely appropriate 
because while the treatment of some aspects of common law duties appears to 
be exhaustive (e.g., the duty to avoid conflicts), in large part the duties 
included in the statute are general standards. This means the Courts continue 
to have a wide discretion in the manner in which the duties are applied to the 
conduct of directors."
119 
Farrar, in discussing s137, makes the following comments. 
"The relationship of s13 7 to the common law and equity is unclear. On the 
face of it, it seems to restate the case law, and not necessarily to supersede 
it. ,,J 20 
" Section I 37 of the New Zealand Act, unlike s232(1 I) of the Australian Act, 
does not clearly preserve the common law and equity. Nevertheless, the 
. . h h l . d . ,, 121 assumptzon is t at t e case aw survives, an coexists. 
These comments suggest that the statute has not displaced the common law as 
it applies to breaches of duties but do not answer the question of what the limits of its 
operation under the Act may be. 
D Issue undecided 
It is clear is that the issue of codification has not been settled judicially. In 
Taurus Transport v Taylor & Ors, 
122 an application to strike out the plaintiffs 
reliance on two common law causes of action was refused. The issue of whether the 
Act is a code so that common law claims against directors was precluded was held to 
118 Beck, above n 115, 1-2 
11 9 DO Jones Company Law in New Zealand: A Guide to the Companies Act Butterworth 's 1993, 113 
120 John H Farrar "Th1- Duties of Care of Company Directors : One or Many, Delegation and Busi
ness 
Judgment" New Zealand Business Law Quarterly Vol 5 204,206 
121 Above n120, 208-9 
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be in the nature of a test case. New Zealand courts have continued to see directors as 
fiduciaries and evaluate their actions in the context of the common law on fiduciary 
obligations and the remedies that flow therefrom. 123 
E Modification of statutory duties 
There is, in any event, judicial support for this proposition that statutory duties 
are capable of modification. In Pascoe, 124 the court did not have to consider whether 
it should exercise its discretion to relieve a director of liability under s 1318 of the 
Corporations Law because it held that he had not breached any duty. Debelle J did, 
nevertheless, make the following observation: 
"There is, however, a nice question whether shareholders can relieve a 
director from a breach of his statutory duties. But, as the statutory duties 
reflect the duties of the director at common law and in equity, I do not think 
there is any impediment to a shareholder excusing a breach of statutory 
duty. ,,125 
Debelle J did not distinguish between an excusal before or after the event: his 
comment is broad enough to apply to both. The question of an excusal prior to a 
breach was addressed by the High Court of Australia in Whitehorse v Carlton Hotel 
Pty Ltd. 126 The court's dicta supports the proposition that shareholders can redefine 
the duties of directors in appropriate circumstances so as to forgive potential breaches 
of statutory duties. The ratification works prospectively on the basis that it 
determines the duty. The comments are consistent with the broader proposition 
advanced by Debelle J. Baxt criticises both analyses as "not correct". 127 He also 
recognises, however, that the point is undecided. 
122 HC, 22 May 200 Master Thomson, Napier CP 33/99 
123 Macalister Apparel Ltd v Ishizuka (1998) 8NZCLC 261,663, an action claiming oppression based 
on breach of fiduciary duty, is an example. 
124 Above n22, 
125 Above n22, 772 
126 
( 1987) 162 CLR 285; 70 ALR 251 
127 Above n 110, 90 
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VII THE GENERAL DUTIES EXAMINED 
An Australian text advances the suggestion that ratification of a statutory duty 
will be effective where the content of the statutory and common law duty is the 
same. 128 This offers a possible solution to the problem. Ratification might be 
considered effective in respect of those duties in the Act entirely congruent with a 
common law duty. It is useful to examine the duties covered in ss 131-13 7 to see 
whether the Act has made any changes to the duties that would render ratification 
impossible or inappropriate. 
A The duty to act in good faith and in the best interests of the company 
Section 131 embodies the key fiduciary duty of loyalty to the interests of the 
company, of placing the company's interest above the director's own. Ratification of 
a breach is possible at common law. In Furs Ltd v Tomkies
129 a managing director 
used his knowledge of secret manufacturing processes, property belonging to the 
company, to secure employment with the firm purchasing the company's business. 
The selling company was deprived of the benefit of these assets in the purchase price. 
The director was found to have breached his fiduciary duty but it was clearly stated 
that his actions could have been authorised by the general meeting or by all 
shareholders acquiescing. 
It is possible that the Act has changed the common law duty by the use of the 
word "best". The argument is that, whereas previously the obligation was only to act 
in what directors subjectively believed to be in the company's interests, 
130 the 
requirement to act in its best interests imports an obligation to exercise reasonable 
skill and care. 131 This might make a difference in a case like Re Welfab Engineers 
Ltd132 where the court tolerated the directors' refusal to accept the highest offer for the 
128 Ford's Principles of Corporations Law, paragraph 8.385 
129 
( 1936) 54 CLR 583 
130 Based on the formulation of Lord Greene, MR in Re Smith & Fawcett Ltd [ 1942] Ch 304,306 
131 Discussed by Watts in Rennie and Watts, above n91, at 7-9. 
132 
[ 1990) BCLC 833 
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company's land in favour of one that was more likely to see the business continue, 
thereby protecting the employees. (Such an outcome appears, on the facts, to be open 
to directors under sl32.) The implication might be that as an element of objectivity 
has been introduced into the duty Parliament can be taken to have intended that 
shareholders would not be competent to ratify breaches. However, given that the duty 
in s131 is framed subjectively, it is difficult to see that the inclusion of "best" makes 
any difference at least as long as the directors honestly hold the belief. A court will 
not reach a conclusion different from that which it would under common law. 
Ratification should therefore continue to be available. 
The other possible objection is that the meaning of "the company" has been 
extended from what is was at common law. Although the Law Commission may have 
sought to change the construct of the company in this way, it is not a conclusion that 
the Act requires. 
There seems no reason, therefore, why ratification should not operate under 
s131 as it has at common law. Although theoretically available to the majority, the 
reality is that courts are reluctant to accept breaches of fiduciary duty. Some 
objection is frequently found. The meeting may have been inadequately informed 
(Winthrop 133), or infected by the same improper purpose pursued by the directors 
(Residues 134) , or have acted oppressively (Jenkins135). Although the issue involved a 
shareholders' vote to discontinue a representative action rather than ratification of 
directors ' duties, Sir Robert Megarry held that the majority ' s vote could be an abuse 
of power in the absence of evidence that the meeting had ever adequately considered 
what was for the company ' s benefit. 136 In practice, therefore, very clear shareholder 
confirmation of the breach will be required. The ratification should be by all 
shareholders wherever possible and interested directors should refrain from voting. 
133 Above n29 
134 Above n32 
135 Above n52 
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B The duty to use powers for a proper purpose 
The application of this duty at common law has been confined within narrow 
limits, with almost all cases involving dealings in the company's shares.
137 The 
leading authority is the Privy Council decision in Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol 
Petroleum Ltd1 38 the ratio of which is usually interpreted as being restricted to 
situations where share issues alter the balance of control among shareholders. There 
is no reason why the cases concerning ratification of share issues
139 should not remain 
applicable in this context. Whether courts will extend the scope of the duty remains 
to be seen. 140 The duty is, however, closely related to the duty under sl 31. The Law 
Commission did not include it as a separate duty in its draft statute presumably 
because it considered it contained within the good faith/best interests duty. If 
ratification is available for a breach of s131 , it should also be available under s133 . 
C The duty to comply with Act and constitution 
A declaration that directors must obey the Act would seem superfluous and a 
formal requirement to comply with the constitution only slightly less so. It might be 
assumed that such transgressions would inevitably involve infractions of other duties, 
particularly the duties of good faith and care, or that any remedy sought would be 
based on whatever specific breach was alleged. There is no duty formulated in the 
terms of s134 at common law so it would seem to be a statutory duty. 
"As this is a statutory duty, failure to comply with it will mean that one of the 
statutory remedies can be invoked. " 
141 
136 Estmanco (Kilner House) Ltd v Greater London Council [ 1982] I All ER 43 7 
137 Rennie and Watts, above n91 , 22 
138 [1974] AC 821 
139 Bamford v Bamford above n I; Hogg v Cramphorn Ltd above n25, 
140 It was pleaded in MacFarlane v Barlow, for example, in respect of directors' decisions over salaries 
and loans to related parties. 
141 Morison 's Company and Securities Law, paragraph 24.16 
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Morison, and Watts, 142 point variously to injunctions (sl 64), orders against directors 
and the company (ssl 70 and 172) and to actions for oppression (sl 74) as being 
available for a breach of the duty. It is unclear to the writer how s 134 could be the 
basis of an application for relief in its own right without it being necessary to plead 
the precise breach. The provision seems less of a separate duty and more of an 
exhortation. It is not identified in sl69(3) as a duty owed by directors to the 
company. 143 (Nor is it subject to penalties under ss373 and 374.) It is suggested that it 
is unlikely that a breach of the provision, on its own, could be the basis of an action 
and the issue of ratification is of little relevance. 
D The duties concerning reckless trading and incurring obligations. 
At common law, creditors came into consideration once a company was 
insolvent or nearly so. The responsibility to creditors can be analysed as a duty to 
creditors directly; '1 separate duty to the company; a subsidiary part of the duty to act 
in the interests of the company; or simply a limitation on directors powers rather than 
a specific duty. 
"It is clear that the duty to take into account the interests of creditors is 
merely a restriction on the right of shareholders to ratify breaches of the duty 
owed to the company. The restriction is to be found in cases involving fraud 
on the minority. Where a company is insolvent or nearing insolvency, the 
creditors are to be seen as having a direct interest in the company and that 
interest cannot be overridden by the shareholders. " 144 
Whatever the correct analysis, it is clear that, at common law, shareholders 
could not ratify actions that might prejudice the interests of creditors once insolvency 
loomed. Whether this situation has been materially changed depends on the 
interpretation given to ss 135 and 136, provisions that are complex and subject to 
142 Above n9 I , 30 
143 Watts, above n9 l , at 31 says it is "logical " to regard it as being owed to both, an assertion that is 
surely questionable. 
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criticism. Section 135 concerning carrying on business "in a manner likely to create a 
substantial risk of serious loss to the company' s creditors" may pose a problem. The 
issue is the extent to which it may come into play beyond the usual circumstances of a 
company in significant, and more than short term, financial trouble. How far does it 
apply to transactions that could possibly result in the liquidtaion of an otherwise 
sound company? Opinion on this is divided, particularly in respect of how far it 
inhibits risk taking, 145 and will only be resolved by a body of case law. To the extent 
the provision is given a wide scope, so will the interests of creditors be enlarged and 
the possibility of effective ratification be restricted. 
E The duty of care 
Pavlides v Jensen 146 remains authority for the proposition that the general 
meeting can ratify by majority the actions of directors that are negligent but not 
fraudulent. The ratio was distinguished in Daniels v Daniels1
47 where it was held that 
ratification was not possible where the negligence benefited the negligent directors . 
(In Daniels the land sold to one of the directors increased in value 28-fold within four 
years.) 
Section 13 7 is generally considered to have changed the common law by 
imposing an objective test of care. It might be argued that, by this change, the 
legislature consciously created a separate statutory duty different from the common 
law. Conversely, it could be said that by 1993 the common law was in the process of 
moving from a position where the test was a subjective one set at a low level, towards 
an objective test. 148 The enactment of the objective test in s 13 7 may itself have 
perfected that evolution at common law as well. If so, the standard of care required of 
directors of bodies incorporated outside the Act is the same for directors subject to the 
Act. If ratification is available in the former, why should it not be available under the 
Act as well? 
144 Sycotex v Baseler 13 ACSR 766, 785 per Gummow J 
145 Compare Morison at 24.16 with Watts above n91 at 36. 
146 Above n 16 
147 Above n43 
Laws 523/531 Corporate and Banking Law Ratification under the Companies Act 1993 
40 
There is no doubt that the lifting of the duty of care was one of the key 
measures considered necessary to procure better corporate governance. However, 
there is nothing in the Act which requires that it be considered any differently from 
the other principal duties in terms of the capacity of shareholders to ratify breaches. 
In any event, the practical significance of ratification of such breaches may have 
reduced since the Court of Appeal decision in Bank of New Zealand v New Zealand 
Guardian Trust Co Ltd. 149 The Court150 identified three types of breaches of duty of 
care. In the first two (direct losses to trust property and breach of loyalty) the 
fiduciary will be held to account on a restitutionary basis; in the third, where the 
relationship between the parties is incidental, the rules applicable in contract and tort 
will apply. The view of commentators 151 is that breaches of the duty of skill and care 
by directors will fall into the third category, meaning causation and remoteness will 
be determined as in law rather than equity. 
F Summary 
The conclusion is that there is nothing in ss 131-137 which renders ratification 
of directors' breaches by shareholders, either by majority or unanimity, inapplicable. 
148 Daniels v Anderson (1995) 16 ACSR 607,652 but cfthe Privy Council in Kuwait Asia Bank EC v 
National Mutual Life Nominees Ltd [ 1990) 3 NZLR 513 
149 
[ 1999] I NZLR 664 
150 Per Tipping J, 687 
151 Crengle et al, above n82, 6 and Morison, 24. 10 
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VIII RATIFICATION OF BREACHES OF OTHER DUTIES 
A General 
Sections 139 to 144 deal comprehensively with transactions m which a 
director may have an interest. The meaning of "interested" is defined, the disclosure 
required specified, and the impact on third parties covered. Failure to disclose 
· f'C'. 152 constitutes an o 1ence. Although a director remains subject to other duties, 
particularly s 131, the conclusion must be that the Act has effectively provided a code 
in respect of this duty, the requirements of which can only be avoided by the 
agreement of all entitled persons under s107(3). Ratification will not excuse a 
director of liability for a breach, even if unanimous. The latter may be of some use as 
a protection against an action for oppression by a shareholder who subsequently 
changes their view. 
B Corporate opportunities 
One area where the common law on ratification has not always been clear 
relates to where directors have taken advantage of opportunities available to them by 
virtue of their position with their company. In some cases
153 directors have not been 
found in breach despite the general proposition established by Cooks v Deeks.
154 
The Act does not enunciate any duty on directors in respect to the use of 
corporate opportunities as such but it does regulate the use of company information. 
Section 145 prohibits a person disclosing, using or acting on information obtained in 
their capacity as a director and it would seem clear that any situation where a director 
seeks to exploit a "corporate opportunity" would entail the use of information so 
acquired. A procedure is available under s145(3) whereby the board may authorise 
152 Section 140(4) 
153 Queensland Mines Ltd v Hudson above n27, Peso Silver Mines Ltd v Cropper ( 1966) 58 DLR (2d) 1 
154 Above n46 
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the use of the information provided disclosure is recorded in the interests register and 
the use will not prejudice the company. Although prejudice is not defined, it would 
appear that the Act imposes a strict regime based on the common law under which 
directors will be required to disgorge profits made even where the company itself for 
various reasons may be unable to take advantage of the opportunity. 155 
Section 145 is silent on whether shareholders can authorise a director to act on 
information in circumstances where that will prejudice the company. Can 
shareholders, via s 1 77 ( 4 ), authorise a use when directors cannot? Harris 156 suggests 
reference to the common law is open in such a case. The case law does, however, 
yield the answer that the breach would not be ratifiable by the majority at common 
law so the outcome is the same as if ratification were not available under the Act. 
Harris does suggest157 that the breach could be ratified effectively by shareholders 
acting unanimously, citing Furs Ltd v Tomkies158and Re Gee & Co (Woolwich) Ltd. 159 
This assertion 1s m line with the general principle of unanimity discussed 
above. However, it can be challenged on the following grounds. Section 145 
concerns directors' conflicts of interest. Although the transaction under the section 
will not constitute a transaction in which a director is interested under s 140 (because 
the company is not a party to the transaction) both provisions involve similar issues 
about the directors' fiduciary duty of loyalty to the company's interests. Unlike s140, 
however, s145 is not within the scope of s107. Given the similarity of the underlying 
issue, it is to be assumed that the exclusion was intentional, Parliament having marked 
off s145 (and s162 concerning insurance and indemnification) from s140. 
The counter argument is that this attaches too much significance to s 107 which 
should be regarded as making available as means of avoiding administratively 
cumbersome transactional requirements. Harris's view is probably correct. 
155 GE Smith, Ltd v Smith above n47 
156 Bede Harris "Fiduciary duties of directors under the Company Act 1993" 1994 NZLJ 242,243 
157 Harris, above n 156, 243 
158 Above n 129, 592 
159 Above n21, 71 
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C Duty to disclose dealing in shares 
Sections 14 7 to 149 impose obligations on directors to disclose their 
shareholdings and may only acquire or dispose of shares for fair value when in 
possession of information material to the assessment of the value of shares. Liability 
is to a third party in the case of acquisition. The situation is similar to that with self-
interest transactions under ss 139-144 although the provisions are not as 
comprehensive. It is suggested that ratification is not available or relevant to the 
operation of these provisions. 
D Ratification and transactions within sl 07 
For the reasons given in IV E it must be assumed that the transactions listed in 
s 107 are not amenable to ratification in the normal sense. They must be approved by 
the full majority of entitled persons in the manner laid down. Even in relation to the 
duties covered by s 107, however, ratification may have an influence. The test under 
these sections is basically fairness to the company.
160 In two instances, the 
transactions must also be in the best interests of the company.
161 These obligations 
rest with directors, and cannot be transferred to shareholders. The test is also an 
objective one, so the transaction must be capable of withstanding review by a court. It 
is suggested, nonetheless, that a ratification by a simple majority will be persuasive 
evidence of fairness in any subsequent challenge. The shareholders resolution will 
need to comply with the common law requirements in that the use of voting power 
does not itself represent a fraud on the minority. Provided it does, the ratification 
should serve to fortify directors. 
160 Section 55(2)(a) re discount schemes, s60(3)(b) re self purchase of shares, s69(2)(b) re share 
redemptions, s76(2)( c J re financial assistance to purchase shares, s 161 (I) re remuneration and s 141 (2) 
re self-interested transactions. 
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IX RATIFICATION AND THE STATUTORY REMEDIES 
A Injunctions 
A shareholder can seek injunctions and orders to enforce compliance with the 
Act or constitution. 162 A director is exposed to a claim for damages in a case where 
an injunction is granted. 163 Ratification should be sufficient to satisfy the court that 
the act or omission complained of did not breach either the Act or the constitution. 
B Oppression 
The leading case on the meaning of "oppressive, unfairly discriminatory, or 
unfairly prejudicial"164 remains Thomas v H W Thomas Ltd, 165 and in particular the 
judgment of Richardson J, as he then was. 
"The statutory concern is directed to instances or courses of conduct 
amounting to an unjust detriment to the interest of a member or members of a 
company. It follows that it is not necessary for a complainant to point to any 
actual irregularity or to an invasion of his legal rights or to a lack of probity 
or want of good faith towards him on the part of those in control of the 
company. 
It follows that actions under sl 74 do not necessarily depend upon directors' 
breaches of duty to the company but often will. 166 Remedies are not infrequently 
sought under both s165 and sl 74 on the same facts. 167 Ratification may, therefore, be 
relevant to whether directors were acting in compliance with this duty. Alternatively, 
161 Section 69(2)(a) re redemption of shares and s76(2)(b) re financial assistance. 
162 Sections 164, 170, 172 
163 Section 164(3) 
164 Section 174(1) 
165 
[ I 984] I NZLR 686 
166In Macalister, above nl23, the plaintiff's claim of oppression was based on breach of fiduciary duty. 
167 Baker v Perry CM HC New Plymouth, Master Kennedy-Grant, CP27/98 is an example. 
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if the complaining shareholder voted to ratify an act or course of conduct upon which 
he or she subsequently seeks to base a claim, the ratification is likely to diminish their 
chance of success. 
The use of voting power at a general meeting to pass a resolution that the 
minority opposes will not, in itself, amount to oppression.
168 However, ratification 
may itself be an act of oppression. 
" .. (I')he holding of a general meeting of shareholders for the purpose of 
remedying oppression does not work where the oppressor effectively controls 
rhe voting power of such meeting. The meeting itself works further 
. ,, 169 
oppression. 
C Derivative action 
Ratification is likely to be of greatest relevance in a derivative action. 
170 
Before a court can grant leave, it must be satisfied that either the company does not 
intend to bring an action or that it is not in the interests of the company to leave the 
proceedings in the hands of the directors or shareholders.
171 Ratification will be 
confirmation of the former so, technically at least, it would seem that where it occurs 
a court has jurisdiction under sl 65. Its discretion to grant leave is unfettered although 
it must consider the four factors in s 165(2). Of these, "the likelihood of the 
proceedings succeeding"
172 is probably the most important. The standard required for 
leave has not been particularly high. 
173 A clear demonstration of shareholder 
168 Re Empire Building Ltd [ 1972] NZLR 683 (involving a building on the site of the BNZ building in 
Willis Street). 
169 Jenkins v Enterprise Gold Mines NL, above n52, 560. 
170 Sections 165-166 
171 Section 165(3) 
172 Section 165(2)a) 
173 It has been sufficient for there to be "an arguable case". Tharrington v McCann (1998) 8 NZCLC 
261,564; Baker, above n 167; MacFarlane v Barlow, above n71 
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approval, either by unanimity or majority vote, should determine the matter in the 
directors' favour on the basis that the action for which leave is sought could not 
succeed. 
Even if this were not conclusive, it is submitted that a ratification should 
usually be a powe,ful argument under s 165(2)( d). Here, the court must consider the 
interests of the company in the proceedings proposed. The purpose would appear to 
be to allow broad considerations about the impact of the proceedings on the company 
to be taken into account in the judgment whether to grant leave. None of the New 
Zealand cases on s 165 have attached much weight to such factors. In Vrij v Boyle, 174 
"the prospect of a meritorious claim" rendered the granting of leave affirmatively in 
the company' s interests. In similar circumstances in Tharrington v McCann, 175 
Laurenson J thought it was in the interests of the company that the matter of the duty 
claimed to be owed to the company be resolved "as a matter of principle" . 176 In 
MacFarlane v Barlow177 it was claimed that it would be disruptive of the small 
company' s association with its French supplier if there were a liquidation or 
substantial internal dispute between shareholders. This was dismissed, the comment 
being that directors could not shelter behind such an argument. 
The rejection of the argument was probably justified on the facts of the latter 
case, although the company' s success seems to have been largely due to its exclusive 
agency. The other cases also concerned incorporated partnerships where the interests 
of the company as a separate entity may be minimal. For a larger company, the 
consequences of a derivative action may be serious. In addition to having to meet 
both its own and the plaintiffs costs, the company faces the indirect cost of 
management time being diverted from ongoing activities. If the claim is large, it may 
paralyse the enterprise as it avoids taking new risks. It may damage the reputations of 
both the company and its directors in the market place. Management may leave to 
174 [1995] 3 NZLR 763 
175 Above n 173 
176 Above nl73, 261,571 
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avoid being ensnared in the turmoil. For the company, all the pressures are towards 
settling, rather than risk the damage that a court case may cause. For these reasons, 
and without supporting Young J' s example in Mesenberg, 
178 it is suggested that the 
implications of proceedings for the company should be given serious consideration. 
179 
Ratification, if it occurs in this context, should be very influential. In Smith v Croft,
180 
Walton J gave detailed consideration to the views of the disinterested shareholders on 
the issues on which the derivative action was based and these were decisive in his 
reaching the conclusion that the action should not proceed. In summary, courts will 
need to be cognisant of the scale of the company concerned in evaluating its interests 
in a derivative action. 
D Liquidation 
Like its predecessor (s320 in the 1955 Act) s301 is generally considered a 
procedural provision, conferring on a shareholder, creditor or liquidator the right to 
sue but not itself establishing a basis of liability. The court ' s power under s301 is 
very broad and the question is whether it is limited by sl 77(4) such that the court is 
prevented from making an order on the application of a shareholder or liquidator 
where a director' s breach has been ratified. 
E The need for a for ma/ release? 
The position at common law appears to be that a director remains exposed 
when control of a company changes, such as in a liquidation. 
"Jn truth what ratification achieves, generally speaking, is to block action by 
177 Above n7 l 
178 Above n 15 
179 As it was in relation to an application under s 18 of the Securities Amendment Act 1988 in Colonial 
Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd v Wilson Neill Ltd (No 2) [ 1993] 2NZLR 617 
180 
[ I 986] 1 WLR 580 
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the minority shareholders, leaving vulnerability still to new controllers in the 
event of a future change of control; see for example Regal (Hastings) Ltd v 
Gulliver [1967} 2 AC 134N. That is why one would expect the directors 
relying on ratification would also want a documented formal deed of release 
from the board. "181 
It is unclear whether this is the case in New Zealand. A literal reading of 
sl 77(4) points to such a conclusion, in which case directors who have secured 
ratification may not be as well protected as they believe. In cases where the 
ratification happened well before liquidation, injustice could result. It is suggested, on 
grounds of general principle, 182 that a formal release should certainly not be necessary 
in cases where the ratification has been by unanimity unless there is some reason to 
believe the ratification was motivated by a desire to defeat creditors. This, in fact, is 
what s 1 77 ( 4) appears to have been designed to achieve. 183 It is further suggested that 
ratification by majority should also be conclusive if otherwise sound. The legislature 
having recognised the ability of shareholders to act on behalf of the company via 
ratification, the courts should accept that it serves the purpose of curing the breach. 
181 Miller v Miller, above n I 04, 87 and see Part II G 
182 Pascoe, above n22, also provides support. 
183 Watts, above n91 
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X CONCLUSION 
A Summary of ratification under sl 77 
The first limb dealing with ratification of directors' exercise of shareholders ' 
powers is restricted to powers vested in shareholders by the Act and the constitution 
and does not extend to powers that might be regarded as exercisable by shareholders 
at common law. It is likely to permit ratification of directors' acts that fail to comply 
with s 129 concerning major transactions and s221 concerning amalgamations 
provided the ratification is effected by a special resolution. 
Section 177(3) preserving the court's power to make orders notwithstanding 
any ratification under sl 77(1) must be read as subject to sl 77(4). Any breach of duty 
involved in the action falling within sl 77(1) is ratifiable by shareholders by majority 
or unanimous vote. 
The inclusion of directors ' general duties in the Act does preclude breaches of 
them being ratified. Ratification is not available, however, in respect of the duties 
covered by ss139-149 except that all shareholders may be able to authorise a use of 
company information that would otherwise contravene s145. 
The Act's requirements in relation to those transactions listed in s107 can only 
be avoided via the use of s107. Failure to comply with the requirements cannot be 
cured by ratification. 
Even if ratification is not treated as eliminating the possibility of a successful 
action against directors, it will be a significant factor in actions under ss165 and 174. 
A ratification of an action by a fully informed and disinterested majority is likely to be 
treated as conclusive evidence of the best interests of the company in relation to a 
derivative action and is likely to be a highly persuasive answer to allegations of 
oppression. 
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There are three areas where the law is unclear, namely: 
• The compatibility of ratification with s 162; 
• Whether a formal release is required to protect directors absolutely; 
• Whethu interested directors who are also shareholders can vote on the 
resolution. 
These are matters on which legislative clarification would assist. 
Within these bounds, ratification remains effective. According ratification its 
common law significance is compatible with the statutory regime; it is workable and 
does not violate any core principles. The position in New Zealand is correctly 
summarised as follows: 
"Jn general, including the case of companies under the 1955 Act, a 
transaction that requires ratification (such as for directors ' breach of 
fiduciary duty) is ratifzable by a bare majority of shareholders, unless the 
transaction itself would amount to a fraud on a minority" 184 
Although the Act has reduced the scope of ratification in certain areas, such as 
directors' remuneration, it remains a valuable mechanism. The corporate lawyer's 
faith in it is justified. 
B The role of shareholders 
Whether this constitutes an appropriate state of affairs depends on whether 
shareholders are seen as capable of playing a role in the management of a company. 
The origins of ratification lie in simple concepts well known to the law and with 
obvious appeal from a policy perspective. The problem is not the concept itself but its 
184 The Laws of New Zealand, Vol 6 Companies, paragraph 209 
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application in a company context, particularly given the realities of the large, modem 
company characterised by the separation of ownership and control. The principal 
objection is that directors are able to control the general meeting with far less than 
50% of the voting power. Thresholds in takeover laws around the world suggest little 
more than 30% is required and at this level it is too easy for directors to treat the 
1 · " h ,, 185 genera meetmg as a cyp er . In this situation, the minority shareholder is 
vulnerable and deserves the protection of recourse to the courts. 
In seeking to relegate shareholders from a role in management the Law 
Commission may have over reacted to the excesses of the 1980's. These were 
perpetrated by a few, admittedly powerful, large corporations. Yet, by far the 
majonty of entities using the corporate form are small. In these, the shareholders very 
definitely are "the company". Here, ratification serves a sensible and useful purpose, 
providing the company with a means of remedying the problems which, through 
inexperience, will inevitably occur. It ensures that "everything will go on as if it had 
been alright from the beginning".
186 If a problem exists, it is in the Act's "one size 
fits all" approach. 
Even in larger companies there may be grounds for having somewhat more 
faith than the Law Commission in the general meeting. It is only seven years since 
the Act was passed but even in that time developments have occurred. Institutions are 
more active as shareholders than they have been traditionally and shareholder 
activism is increasing. Electronic communications, particularly via the Internet, may 
make shareholder participation in polling far more practical. Finally, there is always 
the remedy under s 17 4, the ultimate backstop of an unhappy minority shareholder. 
The extent to which shareholders should be capable of ratifying directors' 
breaches will remain controversial. No doubt the next cycle of corporate excess will 
stimulate calls for stricter director accountability and a reduction in, if not the 
elimination of, shareholders powers of ratification. For the present, there 1s no 
indication that the law as it currently stands is failing in any significant respect. 
185 Above n6 I 
186 Bamford v Bamford, above n I 
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